Tightening the Reigns on Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction by Lawyer, David
COMMENT
Tightening the Reigns on Pendent and Ancillary
Jurisdiction
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Article III,section 2 of the United States Constitution makes this principleclear by the statement that "judicial Power shall extend to allCases . . arising under this Constitution, the Laws of theUnited States, and Treaties . ..and .. . to all controversies
. .. between Citizens of different States . . ."' One mightargue that "judicial power" under article 1112 is not the samething as jurisdiction. But the exercise of jurisdiction in situa-tions in which a federal court does not have judicial power wouldnot be likely to yield any conclusive results between the parties. 3
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2. The judicial power of the federal courts is limited to "Cases" and to "Controver-sies". The case and controversy requirement serves to preclude judicial determinationswhere concrete adversity is lacking. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316-17(1974) (when an individual who sues on his own behalf encounters circumstances thatrender his interests immune to any judicial determination, the court may not considerthe substantive issues in the complaint); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968) (onlywhere taxpayers have a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of a lawsuit do they have
standing to sue as taxpayers).
3. Besides the fact that article III limits the jurisdiction of federal courts, historyhas shown that Congress may not change the jurisdictional framework of the federalcourt system without amending the Constitution. In the landmark case of Marbury v.Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the Supreme Court invalidated an act of Con-gress because the act would have enlarged the article III, § 2 original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, as interpreted by the Court.Thus, one can safely say that article III marks the outer limits of the subject matterjurisdiction of federal courts. But Congress must confer jurisdiction upon federal courts,within those limits, by statute. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (granting general "federalquestion" jurisdiction to federal courts). It is generally accepted that Congress has nevervested the entire judicial power of article III in the federal courts. See C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3526 (West 1983) [hereinaftercited as WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER]. This Comment focuses on the constitutional limitsto jurisdiction, but the reader should keep in mind that the present extent of congressio-nally conferred jurisdiction of the federal courts is in fact more narrow than article III,
by itself, would permit.
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At the heart of the idea of limited jurisdiction is the concept of"cases" and "controversies." The following analysis will explore
the limits of the scope of a constitutional case and will suggest
that federal courts have lost sight of their expressly limited role
in adjudication by expanding the scope of the constitutional
case. This phenomenon has been responsible for an unwarranted
intrusion by federal courts into adjudications on questions of
state law.
State courts, in contrast to federal courts, are courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction, though there are exceptions to this rule.4 With
only a few exceptions, however, state courts are empowered to
hear claims and counterclaims between parties regardless of the
federal or state law character of those claims.
5
This bifurcated system of justice contains safeguards for the
uniform application of federal law. One safeguard is the appeal
process of suits originating in state courts. Where the suit
involves a question of federal law and where the highest state
court has decided the case, the United States Supreme Court
can grant certiorari and review the case. Indeed, with only one
exception,7 "federal question" cases could not originate in fed-
eral court until 1875.8 Thus, until 1875, appellate review of fed-
eral questions decided in state courts seemed to adequately min-
imize the risk that state court interpretations of federal law
might dictate the evolution of federal law construction. But the
eventual expansion in the number and scope of federal statutes
led to a need for increased uniformity of construction of federal
law, which in turn led to a "full independent national system of
federal trial courts."9 A second safeguard to state court domina-
tion of federal law interpretation is the doctrine of removal,
4. Certain state courts have jurisdictional requirements regarding the amount in
controversy (e.g., small claims court), while other state courts restrict the content of the
claims asserted (e.g., probate court). In addition, Congress has made jurisdiction for cer-
tain types of federal question cases exclusively federal. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982)
(bankruptcy cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1983) (patent and copyright cases).
5. This statement assumes that no defects in personal jurisdiction over the parties
exist, and that service of process can be effectively made.
6. SuP. CT. R. 17.1 (c).
7. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92. The Act allowed federal question cases
to be originally brought in a federal court. The Act was quickly repealed. Act of March 8,
1802, 2 Stat. 132.
8. Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (now codified as 28 U.S.C. 1331 (1982)).
The Act gave federal courts original jurisdiction over federal question cases.
9. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157,
157 (1953).
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whereby defendants in state court suits may request that theproceeding be removed to a federal district court.'0
Although these safeguards exist to ensure that federal
courts have the opportunity, at least in theory, to determine theconstruction of federal law, they do not address the equallyimportant goal of allowing state courts to control the destiny of
state law construction."
The bifurcated structure described admits to a very seriousrisk. Too many suits involving questions of state law may origi-nate in federal court by virtue of a claim in the suit that arises
out of federal law. This deprives state courts of the opportunity
to resolve questions of state law and raises issues of federalism
and comity.' 2 While it is difficult to determine at what point toomany suits involving state law claims are being brought to thefederal courts, at some point the expansion of federal jurisdic-tion to accommodate suits containing state law claims is anencroachment into judicial territory that rightfully belongs to
the states.
One way in which federal courts have effected their expan-sion of subject matter jurisdiction has been through the exerciseof ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. s Through historical analy-
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982). The defendant may request removal of any actionwhere a federal district court could have had original jurisdiction over that suit, which
generally connotes diversity and federal question cases.
11. Such safeguards do, however, exist in other isolated contexts. See, e.g., Erie R.R.v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938) (when state law creates a substantive right, incircumstances in which federal law does not preempt state law, federal courts may notelect to disregard the state law in favor of a substitute federal law. Federal courts areobliged to ascertain whether a particular state law applies in a given circumstance andwhether the law creates a substantive right according to the state's interpretation of its
law).
12. Federalism and comity concepts support the operation of quasi-autonomousgoverning units in a single system. See infra note 106 and accompanying text. The basicidea is that neither unit is completely subordinate to the other. While a general apprecia-tion for the concepts of comity and federalism is crucial to the understanding of thisComment, a detailed explanation is beyond its scope. The seminal work on the subjectwill be found in THE FEDERALIST (Doubleday, 1966), A. HAMILTON, J. MADISON, AND J. JAY.Works specifically related to this Comment's discussion of federal jurisdiction that touchon aspects of federalism and comity are: Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: TheChanging Role of the Federal Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 841 (1972); Schenkier, Ensur-ing Access to Federal Courts: A Revised Rationale for Pendent Jurisdiction, 75 Nw.U.L. REv. 245 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Schenkier]; Shakman, The New Pendent
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 262 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Shakman].
13. Both of these judicially created doctrines enable federal courts to hear claimsover which the courts do not have independent subject matter jurisdiction. For a com-prehensive tracing of the historical developments of the two doctrines, see Champlin,
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sis of both ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, collectively
referred to as auxiliary jurisdiction, this Comment will identify
the constitutional limits of a federal question case under article
III.14 This Comment contends, primarily, that the development
of ancillary jurisdiction has had an impermissibly expansive
impact on the definition of a constitutional "case." The reason
for the expansion of ancillary jurisdiction is that federal courts
have shifted their perspective in viewing the propriety of federal
court adjudication of nonfederal claims. Originally, the federal
courts approached the question of their power to adjudicate
ancillary claims by reference to the necessity of preserving the
judgments and processes of federal courts.' 5 More recently, how-
ever, federal courts have turned to a "convenience perspective,"
determining their power to hear ancillary claims by reference to
the goals of expedience, convenience, and judicial economy."8
While the exercise of pendent jurisdiction has increased to some
extent, it has not undergone such a change in perspective, and
most federal judges now assume that the power of the federal
courts to hear pendent claims is much more narrow than the
power to hear ancillary claims.17
Subject matter jurisdiction raises questions of power, or
competence to adjudicate. Insofar as the two perspec-
tives-necessity and convenience-suggest differences in the
Extension of Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: The Need for a Functional
Approach, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1437 (1980); Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional
Case": Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Juris-
diction, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1399 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Matasar]; Minahan, Pendent
and Ancillary Jurisdiction of United States Federal District Courts, 10 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 279 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Minahan]; Shakman, supra note 12, at 262; Note, A
Closer Look at Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory of Incidental
Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1935 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note]; Note,
The Concept of Law-Tied Pendent Jurisdiction: Gibbs and Aldinger Reconsidered, 87
YALE L.J. 627 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note].
14. A fundamental assumption in the analysis that follows is that extension of juris-
diction to pendent or ancillary claims can only be constitutionally valid if the federal
claims and auxiliary claims fall within a single, consistent definition of a "case." See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2.
15. See infra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 91-113 and accompanying text.
17. See generally Theis, Pendent Jurisdiction Over Claims Arising Under Federal
Law, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 96-97 (1980) (discussing relationship between pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction); Note, Problems of Judicial Power And Discretion in Federal Pen-
dent Jurisdiction Cases, 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 689, 695 (1981) (ancillary jurisdiction
broader in application than pendant jurisdiction which, strictly defined, applies only to
joinder of state and federal claims brought by an original plaintiff against the same origi-
nal defendant).
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power of federal courts to hear auxiliary claims, no constitu-tional or statutory authority supports the difference. This Com-ment asserts that the necessity perspective marks the outer lim-its of power to hear auxiliary claims, and proposes a model forkeeping the exercise of auxiliary jurisdiction within its constitu-
tional limits. The more expansive convenience perspective pur-ports to grant more power to federal courts than the Constitu-tion allows. For this reason, federal courts should return to thenecessity perspective in the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. Bydoing so, federal courts can limit the number of cases comingbefore them that involve issues of state law, with minimum
adverse effects on the parties who will be precluded from bring-ing their nonfederal claims in federal court. Determining juris-
diction from the necessity perspective will guarantee that state
courts will be the primary fora for interpretations of state law.
II. ANCILLARY JURISDICTION-EVOLUTION OF STANDARDS
Ancillary jurisdiction, applying to certain claims filed after,
or ancillary to, the original complaint, is a doctrine permitting afederal court to hear claims over which it would not otherwisehave subject matter jurisdiction. 8 A federal court may exercise
ancillary jurisdiction whenever a party asserts a claim understate law, after the original complaint has been filed in a pro-ceeding containing a federal claim, that is sufficiently closelyrelated to the federal claim in the suit, except in the case of pen-dent jurisdiction-where an original plaintiff brings both federal
and nonfederal claims against the same original defendant.19
18. Subject matter jurisdiction is lacking when opposing parties are not diverse andwhere a case before the court does not arise under federal law. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.19. Ancillary and pendent jurisdiction have been called "two species of the samething." Matasar, supra note 13, at 1399. Pendent jurisdiction differs from ancillary juris-diction only in that the former refers to an original plaintiff bringing a federal claim anda nonfederal claim against the same original defendant. This difference has accountedfor the separate development of the two doctrines and for an apparent consensus thatexercise of pendent jurisdiction is discretionary while exercise of ancillary jurisdiction ismandatory. See Yale Note, supra note 13, at 631. There is considerable debate overwhich doctrine-pendent or ancillary jurisdiction-applies in circumstances where anoriginal plaintiff brings a nonfederal claim against a defendant who, though original tothe action, is not the party against whom the federal claim is brought. See Owen Equip.& Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (federal and nonfederal claims arisingfrom common nucleus of operative facts are not alone sufficient to establish federal courtpower to hear nonfederal claims); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 9 (1976) (nonfederalclaim cannot be the basis for joining a party over whom no independent federal jurisdic-tion exists simply because that claim derives from the common nucleus of operative fact
19851
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The Supreme Court first recognized ancillary jurisdiction in
Freeman v. Howe.20 In Freeman, a United States marshal seized
a number of railroad cars under writs of attachment issued by a
federal court. Individuals with mortgage claims to the property
then brought an action of replevin against the marshal in state
court, and received a favorable judgment. The Supreme Court,
reviewing the state court decision, held that a state court lacks
authority to interfere with property under the control of a fed-
eral court.2' The mortgagees argued that a bar to their state
court action would leave them remediless because they lacked
diversity with the plaintiffs in the federal court action. The
Court held that any party whose interests were affected by the
action in federal court could bring a claim to property already in
the federal court's control and that the mortgagees' state law
claim would be ancillary to the original suit.
22
The Freeman holding can be explained in one of several
ways. One explanation is that property occupies so special a
position in American society that an exception to the normal
limitations of federal subject matter jurisdiction is warranted in
order to protect property interests. 23 Another explanation is that
all claims to property comprise but one constitutional case, in
which event the entire matter is legitimately within the federal
court's subject matter jurisdiction and no exception is neces-
giving rise to the dispute between parties to the federal claim). This situation, often
referred to as pendent party jurisdiction, is related to the issues presented in the follow-
ing analysis, but is beyond the scope of this Comment and will not be discussed. For a
thorough treatment of pendent party jurisdiction, see generally Berch, The Erection of a
Barrier Against Assertion of Ancillary Claims: An Examination of Owen Equipment &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 1979 ARiz. ST. L.J. 253 (court's decision in Owen that a plaintiff
must have independent jurisdictional grounds for assertion of transactionally related
claim against third-party defendants unnecessarily creates an enclave of issues that the
Court may be impotent to adjudicate); Comment, Ancillary Jurisdiction: The Kroger
Approach and the Federal Rules, 28 EMORY L.J. 463 (1979); Critique, Ancillary and
Pendent Party Jurisdiction in the Aftermath of Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 758, 766 (1979) (implication of Owen is that the doctrine of
pendent party jurisdiction may signal the demise of the pendent jurisdiction doctrine).
20. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
21. Id. at 459.
22. Id. at 460. The actual holding of Freeman was very narrow, referring only to
bills in equity relating to claims to property.
23. See, e.g., Note, The Ancillary Concept and the Federal Rules, 64 HARv. L. REv.
968, 976 (1951) (established principles will not support ancillary intervention where
there is no res in court's jurisdiction); Note, Ancillary Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 48 IOWA L. REv. 383, 385-86 (1963) (when res is in court's jurisdiction, the court
may adjudicate all questions relating to the title, possession or control of res, regardless
whether jurisdictional requirements are met, to prevent injustice).
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sary.24 A third explanation is that extension of ancillary jurisdic-
tion over the claim in Freeman was necessary to the full adjudi-
cation of the suit before the court, regardless of the claim being
one to property, and that the claims of nondiverse parties were
for that reason part of the same case.25 Extension of jurisdiction
can be "necessary" in that refusal to hear a nonfederal claim
may violate fifth amendment due process guarantees if parties
with a rightful claim to property before a federal court are com-
pletely foreclosed of a remedy.26 This latter explanation of Free-
man can be appropriately referred to as the "necessity perspec-
tive" of power to exercise auxiliary jurisdiction. Regardless of
which of the three explanations prevailed in the minds of jurists,
the Freeman rule was applied uniformly after 1860.27
In 1926, the Supreme Court significantly expanded ancillary
jurisdiction in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange28 by apply-
ing the doctrine to compulsory counterclaims. In Moore, the
defendant Cotton Exchange refused to sell cotton quotations to
the plaintiff Odd-Lot Exchange. The plaintiff argued that since
the defendant had a monopoly on the quotations, its refusal to
sell quotations to the Odd-Lot Exchange was a restraint of trade
24. See Matasar, supra note 13, at 1465 ("every claim to an identical res would
involve. . . the same transaction .... " Matasar goes on to assert that all claims arising
out of a single transaction are parts of one constitutional "case.").
25. The third approach suggests that the totality of circumstances may warrant call-
ing two claims parts of one constitutional "case," even where the two claims do not
involve a single piece of property.
26. The fifth amendment prohibits deprivations by the federal government of life,
liberty, and property without due process of law. U.S. CONST., amend. V. A heated debate
surrounds the question of whether actions of this sort by federal courts can violate the
fifth amendment.
27. See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 134-35 (1941) ("the court,
whether federal or state, which first takes possession of a res withdraws the property
from the reach of the other."); Looney v. East Tex. R.R., 247 U.S. 214, 221 (1918) (use of
a federal injunction upon parties wishing to sue in state courts is proper when done to
protect and preserve the jurisdiction of the federal court until it can render complete
justice between the parties); Wabash R.R. v. Adelbert College, 208 U.S. 38, 54 (1908) ("a
court during the continuance of its possession has, incident thereto and as ancillary to
the suit . . . jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions respecting the title, the
possession or the control of the property"); In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 181 (1893) ("[n]o
rule is better settled than that when a court has appointed a receiver, his possession is
the possession of the court. . . and that if any person . . . intentionally interferes with
such possession, he necessarily commits a contempt of court .... "); Krippendorf v.
Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1884) (defendant was deprived of the state court remedy of
replevin "by the fact that the proceedings in attachment were pending in a court of the
United States, [and] the property attached . . . is regarded as in the custody of the
court.")
28. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
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in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.2 9 The plaintiff fur-
ther asserted that the refusal to supply the quotations could be
enjoined by a federal court pursuant to the Clayton Act.30 The
defendant, while denying the validity of the plaintiff's claims,
counterclaimed that the plaintiff had been obtaining the quota-
tions anyway, in violation of New York law. 1
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to
dismiss the plaintiff's federal claim on the merits, but upheld
the defendant's state law claim.3 2 The Court reasoned that the
New York Cotton Exchange was conducting intrastate business,
and that its contractual dealings were, therefore, beyond the
reach of the Sherman Act.33 The Court held that the defendant's
counterclaim nevertheless was compulsory under the language of
Equity Rule 30, 3" because the counterclaim arose out of the
transaction that was the subject matter of the original suit.3 5
This relationship was sufficient to warrant an exercise of ancil-
lary jurisdiction over the counterclaim.
By itself, the decision's expansion of ancillary jurisdiction
does little to undermine notions of federalism and comity.3 6 In
fact, the two claims in Moore were so closely intertwined that it
would be very difficult to successfully argue that the two claims
constituted two distinct cases. As the Court noted: " It only
needs the failure of the former [federal claim] to establish a
foundation for the latter [state claim] . . . -37 But, in what was
apparently dictum, the Court went on to add that "transaction"
was a "word of flexible meaning . . . [that] may comprehend a
series of many occurrences, depending . . . upon their logical
relationship."38 This statement gave federal courts no guidance
for future adjudications because of its apparent lack of any lim-
iting principle.
29. 15 U.S.C. § § 1-7.
30. U.S.C. § § 12-14, 21-27.
31. Moore, 270 U.S. at 603.
32. Id. at 611.
33. Id. at 604.
34. Equity Rule 30, 268 U.S. 709 (1925), is the precursor to FED. R. Crv. P. 13(a).
Both rules require a defendant who has a counterclaim that arises out of the transaction
that is the subject matter of the plaintifl's original claim to bring the counterclaim in the
present suit or waive the right to bring the counterclaim in a subsequent proceeding. See
infra note 93 and accompanying text.
35. Moore, 270 U.S. at 609.
36. See supra note 13; infra note 106.
37. Moore, 270 U.S. at 610.
38. Id.
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In addition to the vague definition of the crucial term
"transaction" in Moore, another reason suggests that the case
should not have been viewed as sound precedent.3 When Moore
was decided, the rules of joinder of claims and parties were
much more restrictive than the current federal rules.40 The
Moore Court had no reason to suspect that twelve years after its
decision to extend ancillary jurisdiction to compulsory counter-
claims, an entirely new and expansive system of federal court
procedure that uses the same transactional concepts used in
Equity Rule 30 would have been adopted. 1
Today, courts routinely apply the doctrine of ancillary juris-
diction to compulsory counterclaims, 2 cross-claims, 3 impleader
39. Courts following Moore were left with the conclusion that claims arising out of a
single transaction are parts of the same case. But, from the statement that "transaction"
is a word of flexible meaning, it follows that a constitutional case is a concept of flexible
meaning. While many federal court opinions may support this conclusion, limits on fed-
eral judicial power to hear state law claims are illusory if federal jurisdiction can be
subject to easy expansion.
40. For examples of how narrow the rules of joinder of claims and parties were
before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, see Matasar, supra
note 13, at 1484 n. 387.
41. The rule for compulsory counter-claims is phrased very much like Equity Rule
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). The rule on intervention of right refers to "transaction."
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). The rule for cross-claims refers to the "subject matter of the origi-
nal action." FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g). But, as Professor Matasar explains, "by the late 1960s
federal courts . . . noted that the new Federal Rules [as a whole] could be shoehorned
into the Moore transactional rule." Matasar, supra note 13, at 1413.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). See, e.g., Sue & Sam Mfg. Co. v. B-L-S Constr. Co., 538 F.
2d 1048, 1053 (5th Cir. 1976) (the court exercised ancillary jurisdiction over a lessee's
state law counterclaim against a lessor for rain damage to the lessee's property where the
original claim was brought under diversity jurisdiction by a third party against both the
lessor and the lessee for rain damage to property in the lessee's possession); Pipeliners
Local Union No. 798 v. Ellerd, 503 F.2d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 1974) (union members sued
their employer for violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and the
employer counterclaimed that the plaintiff had violated Colorado law and in so doing
had damaged him. The federal court exercised ancillary jurisdiction over the counter-
claim); Hercules Inc. v. Dynamic Export Corp., 71 F.R.D. 101, 107-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(ancillary jurisdiction was extended to defendant's counterclaims that were found to be
compulsory. The plaintiff had sued to recover the cost of goods delivered to defendant,
who counterclaimed that the delivery was in breach of contract).
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g). See, e.g., City of Boston v. Boston Edison Co., 260 F.2d
872, 874-75 (1st Cir. 1958) (the city and the utility, both defendants in a suit deriving
from a broken water main, cross-claimed against each other for indemnity. Ancillary
jurisdiction was exercised over the state law indemnity claim); Miller v. Carson, 515 F.
Supp. 1375, 1376-77 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (ancillary jurisdiction was extended to a cross-
claim by city defendants against another defendant; the cross-claim involved a state law
question arising from a permanent injunction issued by another federal court); Dow
Corning Corp. v. Schpak, 65 F.R.D. 71, 72 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (ancillary jurisdiction was
extended to a cross-claim between co-defendants in a breach of contract action, where
216 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 9:207
of third party defendants,44 interpleader actions,45 and interven-
tion of right,"" although not without criticism in some circum-
stances. One commentator has said, "If there is any single ratio-
nalizing principle that will explain these diverse rules, it is not
easily discerned. '47 Nevertheless, federal courts have taken the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction further than the Moore Court
could have anticipated.
III. PENDENT JURISDICTION-EVOLUTION OF STANDARDS
Pendent jurisdiction, like ancillary jurisdiction, enables fed-
eral courts to hear claims over which they would not indepen-
dently have subject matter jurisdiction.4 The crucial difference
between the two doctrines is that pendent jurisdiction refers
only to the circumstance in which a nonfederal claim is brought
by an original plaintiff in conjunction with a federal claim
against the same original defendant. The effect of this distinc-
tion is that exercise of pendent jurisdiction is said to be discre-
tionary since a plaintiff could have chosen originally to bring the
entire matter before a state court.49 Although a court may
one co-defendant claimed that the other had breached the agreement with the plaintiff).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 14. See, e.g., Burke v. Ernest W. Hahn Inc., 592 F.2d 542, 545-46
(9th Cir. 1979) (a federal court has ancillary jurisdiction to hear a claim by defendant
employer against trustees of a trust fund, when the employer was sued for contributions
allegedly due the fund); United States v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 792, 794-96 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973) (ancillary jurisdiction was extended to third
party claims against a contractor by the contractor's surety, where the surety was sued
by a subcontractor pursuant to the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C.§ 270 (6)).
45. FED. R. Crv. P. 22. See, e.g., Bauer v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 630 F.2d 1287, 1290 (8th
Cir. 1980) (where a seller who repossessed goods for nonpayment, inadvertently took
back more than was due, and was sued in diversity for conversion, ancillary jurisdiction
was extended to the state law-based interpleader action to join all potential plaintiffs
who might claim damages for the error even if joinder would otherwise have destroyed
diversity); Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108, 114 (1st Cir. 1955) (when defendant inter-
pleaded into a suit additional plaintiffs whose claims to the disputed fund rested on state
law, ancillary jurisdiction was exercised although interpleader would otherwise have
destroyed diversity jurisdiction).
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). See, e.g., Lenz v. Wagner, 240 F.2d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1957)
(ancillary jurisdiction was applied to a creditor who sought to intervene in a suit by the
United States against a taxpayer's widow for taxes allegedly owed, even though the cred-
itor's claim to particular property rested on state law); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Abram-
son, 45 F.R.D. 97, 105 (D.C. Minn. 1968) (a state law claim for abuse of process by an
intervening receiver of an insolvent insurer came within a federal court's ancillary juris-
diction when a bank sued an attorney retained by the receiver pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §
94).
47. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3 at § 3523 at 70.
48. See supra notes 13 & 19 and accompanying text.
49. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 716-17 (1973) (where plaintiffs
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decline to hear a pendent state law claim, the question of the
power to adjudicate state law claims is the same for pendent as
for ancillary jurisdiction °.5
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction originated in Hurn v.
Oursler.51 In Hurn, the plaintiff sued in federal district court,
claiming that the defendants had produced a play in violation of
both the copyright law of the United States and the state fair
business practices law. 2 When the federal claim for copyright
violation failed on the merits, the district court dismissed the
state claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's
decision, 53 the Supreme Court modified the judgment, holding
that the plaintiff needed no independent basis of subject matter
jurisdiction over the pendent claim, as the two claims repre-
sented but one cause of action." The Hurn Court held that a
court has "the right to decide all questions in the case . . * ,"
but more specifically, Hurn relied on the concept of a "cause of
action" as the unit over which the court's subject matter juris-
diction may reach. 5
Although the "cause of action" test has been considered
confusing," the confusion has perhaps been unwarranted
because the Hurn Court defined a cause of action: a state claim
is part of the original cause of action where it "results from the
same acts which constitute the [federal claim] and are [sic]
federal claim was dismissed, the federal court exercised proper discretion in also dis-
missing plaintiff's state law claim, to avoid complication of the case and to avoid unsure
interpretation of state law). See also infra note 87 and accompanying text.
50. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978) (pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction considered "two species of the same generic problem: Under
what circumstances may a federal court hear and decide a state-law claim arising
between citizens of the same State?"). See also Minahan, supra note 13, at 280 (applica-
tion of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction to diversity cases appears to signify an immi-
nent merger of the doctrines); Harvard Note, supra note 13, at 1953 (the labels "pen-
dent" and "ancillary" only confuse federal courts and should be merged into a single
category of incidental jurisdiction).
51. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
52. Id. at 239.
53. 61 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1933).
54. Hurn, 289 U.S. at 248.
55. Id. at 243, citing Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909).
56. "This standard [one cause of action], however, has suffered from a substantial
lack of precision .... " Shakman, supra note 12, at 263. "The Court noted [in United
Mineworkers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)] that in 1933, when Hurn was
decided, the meaning of cause of action was in some dispute." Yale Note, supra note 13,
at 631.
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inseparable therefrom. ' 57 But more specifically
A cause of action does not consist of facts, . but of the
unlawful violation of a right which the facts show. The number
and variety of facts alleged do not establish more than one
cause of action so long as their result . . . is the violation of
but one right by a single legal wrong.58
In spite of an apparently workable standard for determining
when a court may exercise pendent jurisdiction, courts had great
difficulty in determining the meaning of a cause of action and
whether two claims represent a single cause of action. This diffi-
culty increased with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938 and the merger of suits at law and in equity.5 9
In response to the difficulties in applying the Hurn cause of
action test, the Supreme Court articulated a new standard for
the constitutional power to exercise pendent jurisdiction in 1966.
In United Mineworkers of America v. Gibbs,60 a coal company
planning to open a new mine entered into employment contracts
57. Hurn, 289 U.S. at 240.
58. Id. at 246, citing Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927).
59. United Mineworkers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 716, 724-25 (1966) (the Gibbs
Court noted that although FED. R. Civ. P. 2 had eliminated much of the "cause of action"
controversy, the courts continued to apply the Hurn test in an unnecessarily restrictive
manner).
60. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Matasar suggests that the Gibbs standard does not address
constitutional power, but speaks only to statutory authority to exercise pendent (or
ancillary) jurisdiction. Matasar, supra note 13. Matasar claims that an Article III case or
controversy is far more broad than any of the judicial tests thus far developed would
indicate; a case embodies all parties and claims allowable in a single proceeding under
duly promulgated procedural rules. Id. at 1484-90.
Matasar's view is a minority position, although it is well documented. Its logic, how-
ever, is somewhat empty. Jurisdiction is a more fundamental concept than a procedural
rule. The scope of subject matter jurisdiction, derived from the Constitution, has a direct
and immediate impact on the balance of power between the federal and state govern-
ments. See Shakman, supra note 13, at 267. It may well be that independent and liberal
construction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would permit greater joinder of
claims and parties than the Constitution, in a theoretical sense, would allow. Matasar's
thesis contains no substantive vision of the content of a "case" under Article III, which
procedural rules must respect. Unless Matasar is willing to say that a case under Article
III is devoid of any substantive meaning, his assertion that a case is whatever duly
promulgated rules will allow is tautological. It is the constitutional substance of an Arti-
cle III case that determines which rules of procedure are duly promulgated.
Most commentators disagree with Matasar and maintain that Gibbs circumscribed a
constitutional "case" and did not just decide a statutory issue. See e.g., Baker, Toward a
Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. Pirr. L. REV. 759,
784 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Baker] (Gibbs substitution of the word "case" for the
phrase "cause of action" provided greater flexibility to include ancillary and pendent
claims in federal cases).
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with the plaintiff. Subsequently, a number of union members
forcibly prevented the opening of the new mine and established
a limited picket of the mine site."' When Gibbs lost his job as a
result of the mine not opening,"' he filed suit in federal court,
claiming that the union's actions violated section 303 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 63 and constituted
conspiracy and interference with contractual relations, in viola-
tion of state common law. The Supreme Court decided that
although the federal claim was correctly dismissed on the merits,
a federal court still could extend pendent jurisdiction over the
state law claim."
In reaching its decision, the Gibbs Court used a three-part
formula for the power to exercise pendent jurisdiction: (1) the
plaintiff must assert a federal claim of a substantial nature; (2)
the nonfederal claim asserted by the plaintiff must share a
nucleus of operative facts with the federal claim; and (3) one
must ordinarily expect the two claims to be brought at one time,
without consideration of their federal or nonfederal nature.6 5
Largely because the Gibbs Court referred to the Hurn cause
of action standard as "unnecessarily grudging,"6" most commen-
tators have viewed the Gibbs standard as broader than the Hurn
standard; that is, state law claims brought in conjunction with
federal law claims are less likely to be dismissed for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under the Gibbs standard than under the
Hurn standard. 7 This is not entirely obvious. Gibbs offers no
guidance for the degree of commonality of facts a court might
require to determine that state and federal claims share a "com-
mon nucleus of operative facts."
The Gibbs standard can be viewed, then, as a different
articulation of the same cause of action test.68 Nowhere in the
61. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 718.
62. Id. at 720.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 187.
64. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 729.
65. Id. at 725.
66. Id. The Gibbs Court did not state that Hurn had incorrectly assessed the power
of a federal court to extend pendent jurisdiction. Instead, the Gibbs Court noted that
FED. R. Civ. P. 2, which created the unified form of action, had rendered the term "cause
of action" obsolete. Courts after Hum had difficulty defining "cause of action," and the
result was an "unnecessarily grudging" application of the Hum mandate.
67. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 60, at 765; Minahan, supra note 13, at 303;
Shakman, supra note 12, at 265.
68. The Shakman article, supra note 12, points out that the result of Hurn is to give
federal courts the power to extend pendent jurisdiction where adjudication of a federal
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Gibbs opinion did the Court say what "operative facts" are.
Operative facts are arguably those factual events or circum-
stances that give rise to a remedial right-which cause the law in
question, in its remedial function, to operate. The operative
facts, therefore, would be acts or events that comprise the viola-
tion of a primary right. Although many commentators assume
that Gibbs rejected the Hurn cause of action theory, an entirely
logical reading of common nucleus of operative facts produces
an identical standard." Thus, a narrow reading of Gibbs would
lessen the confusion surrounding the meaning of a cause of
action, without broadening the application of pendent
jurisdiction.
IV. PERSPECTIVES APPROACH TO EXTENSION OF AUXILIARY
JURISDICTION
A. The Necessity Perspective
The exercise of auxiliary jurisdiction over the years can be
categorized by a perspectives approach; courts have exhibited a
philosophy or a set of policy concerns regarding the proper cir-
cumstances for federal court adjudication of state law. Federal
courts have responded to the question of power to extend auxil-
iary jurisdiction in terms of either necessity or convenience. 70 In
claim necessarily determines a state law claim. Id. at 273. Since the adjudication of the
plaintiff's Labor Management Relations Act claim in Gibbs necessarily would have deter-
mined the result of the related state claim, Shakman contends that the new Gibbs stan-
dard is superfluous and subject to modification. Later courts, however, have used the
Gibbs standard as a mandate for broad exercise of pendent jurisdiction. Id. at 265.
69. "A cause of action does not consist of facts but of the unlawful violation of a
right which the facts show." Baltimore S.S. Co., 274 U.S. at 321.
70. The early cases in which ancillary jurisdiction was exercised framed the court's
power to exercise such jurisdiction in terms of necessity. See, e.g., Supreme Tribe of
Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921) (ancillary jurisdiction was extended to
members of a class who otherwise would have destroyed complete diversity because "[i]f
the decree is to be effective and conflicting judgments are to be avoided all of the class
must be concluded by the decree."); White v. Ewing, 159 U.S. 36, 38 (1895) (in the
course of settling claims to the assets of a bankrupt corporation through a court-
appointed receiver, all claims to the corporation's assets-based on state or federal
law-are ancillary to the main claim, because the assets in the receiver's possession are
the possessions of the court); Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 283 (1884) (state law
claim to property attached by a federal court was ancillary to the original suit because it
is within a federal court's "power to protect [its) own jurisdiction and officers in the
possession of property that is in the custody of the law, . . . it becomes necessary to
forbid to strangers to the action the resort to the ordinary remedies of the law .... ");
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) ("[C]ertain
implied powers must necessarily result to our courts of justice, . . . [blut jurisdiction of
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the early applications of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, fed-
eral courts used a necessity perspective in the determination of
the scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction.7 Under the
necessity perspective, the scope of a case arising under federal
law was limited to federal questions and to those state law ques-
tions that a federal court must be able to hear to avoid jeopard-
izing the judgments and processes of the federal judicial
system. 2
The obvious weakness of this standard is the difficulty in
ascertaining when dismissal of state claims jeopardizes the judg-
ments and processes of the federal judicial system. A determina-
tion of when a party's state claim will be foreclosed or impaired
if the claim is not allowed into a proceeding in federal court,
however, is not beyond the court's expertise.73 Under the neces-
crimes against the state is not among these powers.").
More recent courts, working with the benefit of a doctrine that has already been
validated, speak less frequently about a federal court's power to decide state law claims
along with federal claims. When they do, however, they inject practical concerns about
time and expense that were conspicuously absent in the earlier decisions. See, e.g.,
United States v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1973) (ancillary claims
may be entertained "to promote the economical and expeditious administration of jus-
tice by avoiding a multiplicity of suits .... "); Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136, 137 (9th
Cir. 1969) ("Pendent jurisdiction was devised to avoid the waste and inefficiency result-
ing from fragmenting a single action .... "); Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. United States ex
rel. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 229 F.2d 370, 374 (9th Cir. 1955) ("Ancillary claims
may be entertained to prevent the relitigation in other courts of issues heard and
adjudged in the original suit.").
71. See supra note 70.
72. One articulation of this idea is that the judicial power of courts, as provided in
article III of the Constitution, contains some notion of implied jurisdictional power.
Thus, preventing federal courts from hearing some state claims would prevent them from
functioning as Courts or from exercising judicial power. A.L.I. STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, § 1313 (West 1969). While this view
does little to limit the scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction, its focus is crucial.
Implied jurisdiction, beyond the express language of article III, is recognized cautiously,
and for a reason much more fundamental than judicial economy. See Yale Note, supra
note 13, at 640 (the original purpose of ancillary jurisdiction was to prevent state courts
from frustrating the power of federal courts, and judicial economy and fairness to liti-
gants were only secondary concerns.).
Early on, the Supreme Court adopted the idea of extending jurisdiction to state law
claims where failure to do so would threaten federal court judgments. Supreme Tribe of
Ben-Hur, 255 U.S. at 367 (upholding an ancillary bill to prevent members of a class in a
class suit from taking their claims to state courts for adjudication, the Court expressly
stated that it may enjoin relitigation in a state court of issues decided by the federal
court).
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) permits a federal court to join to an action any party with
an interest "relating to the subject of the action" who is "so situated that the disposition
of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest, or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substan-
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sity perspective, if a court finds that a party with a state claim
runs a substantial risk of impairing the state claim by adjudica-
tion of the federal claim alone, then the similarities between the
two claims compel the conclusion that the two are parts of one
constitutional "case."
Failure to hear the state claim in such a circumstance could
have several undesirable effects. The party with a state claim
could institute a suit in state court at a later date only to find
that the state court is bound by the disposition of crucial issues
made in the federal suit.74 On the other hand, the state court
might reject the findings and conclusions of the federal court
and resolve the state claim adversely to the prior disposition.75
Finally, the federal court might enjoin the state court from
deciding the state claim until after the federal claim has been
resolved.76 The federal court in such a case still faces the ques-
tion of whether to hear the state claims, but federal-state ten-
sions in the meantime have been exacerbated.
Thus, a standard for the exercise of auxiliary jurisdiction,
derived from the necessity perspective, can be summarized as
follows: (1) the power to extend auxiliary jurisdiction exists
where the state claim in question is part of the same constitu-
tial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations .... " This
is not a determination of jurisdiction, since Rule 19(a) applies only to parties who will
not destroy established diversity jurisdiction. But the court's inquiry is the same one
that can be made, in the jurisdictional context, to decide that it is necessary to hear a
legitimate state claim joined to a related federal claim.
74. The situation described can produce inequitable results. A party in a federal suit
might concede, or fail to vigorously defend, issues that are peripheral to the federal
claim. A subsequent suit in state court might be lost on just such an issue by means of
collateral estoppel. Although the Supreme Court has stated that collateral estoppel shall
only be exercised when a party had sufficient incentive to vigorously defend a particular
issue in a previous proceeding, Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-332
(1979), state courts are not necessarily required to follow this rule. See also Yale Note,
supra note 13 at 648-49 n. 115 (citing Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 86 YALE L.J.
741, 755-56 (1976), the Yale Note claims that these types of suits are likely to be settled
because of the preclusive effect that state courts tend to give to federal court "judgments
and matters adjudicated").
75. This scenario goes to the root of the United States' federal system of govern-
ment. Federal decisional law, derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1738, makes judgments of federal
courts binding on state courts. See RESTATEMENT SECOND OF JUDGEMENTS § 87 (1982).
But it is not clear that state courts must accept the resolution of every issue made at the
federal level since, theoretically, not all findings of fact and law are crucial to the ulti-
mate judgment. See also infra note 76.
76. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur, 255 U.S. at 367 (district court has ancillary jurisdic-
tion in a class action suit and can restrain members of fraternal organizations from
bringing suit against the organization in state court).
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tional case as the federal claim; (2) a case arising under federal
law consists of federal law questions and those state law ques-
tions that a federal court must necessarily decide; and (3) the
necessity element is present wherever adjudication of the federal
claim accompanied by the dismissal of the state claim substan-
tially risks impairing the state claim, either legally or as a practi-
cal matter. The necessity standard reconciles the landmark deci-
sions regarding ancillary and pendent jurisdiction and provides a
model for limiting the exercise of the two doctrines in future
adjudications.77
In Freeman v. Howe," the Supreme Court used a necessity
perspective. The Court's statement that a court with jurisdiction
"has a right to decide every question which occurs in the
cause"7 9 only begs the underlying question why a court should
have such a right. The Freeman Court did not characterize this
power as a matter of mere convenience or efficiency. "Neither
can one take the property from the custody of the other by
replevin, of [sic] any other process; for this would produce a con-
flict extremely embarrassing to the administration of justice." 0
Because the federal court could not permit a state court to
replevy the railroad cars without jeopardizing its own disposition
of the property, its exercise of ancillary jurisdiction was based
upon the necessity perspective. The Court discussed the poten-
tial deterioration of effectiveness of the federal judicial system if
things seized by a federal court could be interfered with by state
courts or by other state bodies."1 Widespread intervention of
this sort would lead to a loss of faith in the federal court's abil-
ity to render justice to parties.
Hurn v. Ourslers2 also used the necessity perspective to
determine auxiliary jurisdiction. The failure to exercise pendent
jurisdiction could have produced the same kind of embarrass-
ment that the Freeman Court feared. Part of the reason the
Hurn Court extended pendent jurisdiction was that the federal
claim of copyright violation "contain[ed] every essential element
77. See supra notes 5, 20-27 & 50-59 and accompanying text.
78. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
79. Id. at 457.
80. Id. at 458-59.
81. Id. at 459. ("We need scarcely remark, that no Government could maintain the
administration or execution of its laws, civil or criminal, if the jurisdiction of its judicial
tribunals were subject to the determination of another.").
82. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
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necessary to justify the conclusion that there was likewise no
unfair competition .... ,,83 If the federal court had not heard
the state claim, collateral estoppel most likely would have fore-
closed the plaintiff's unfair competition claim in a later state
court proceeding, for most of the issues would have been adjudi-
cated by the federal court. Issue preclusion would have resulted
without the plaintiff ever having argued his state claim. Disre-
garding potential due process problems, 84 this situation would,
as a practical matter, have forced the plaintiff to have brought
the original action in state court.8 5
Even the Gibbs Court grounded auxiliary jurisdiction in
necessity, although the language in parts of the opinion suggests
convenience and expedience. The Court noted that the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction is discretionary and should be justified
by "considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness
to litigants ... ."8a This Comment contends that pendent juris-
diction is not really discretionary in the broad sense that Gibbs
suggests.8 7 But regardless of whether discretion is more limited
83. Id. at 247. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
85. While forcing suits to be brought in one forum as opposed to another is not
necessarily undesirable, the consequence of a plaintiff taking both his federal and
nonfederal claims to federal court is irrational under any standard that does not stem
from the necessity perspective. The closer the factual relationship between a state claim
and a federal claim, the more likely that adjudication of the federal claim will resolve
issues central to the state claim. If the plaintiff chooses to bring both state and federal
claims together in federal court, he bears a greater risk of damaging his state claim by
collateral estoppel when it shares most issues with the federal claim as opposed to when
it shares only a few. Such an environment would chill parties from bringing state claims
before a federal court in some circumstances when the federal court would actually
entertain that state claim.
86. United Mineworkers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
87. This comment prefers the view of Shakman, supra note 12. Shakman suggests
that a federal court should extend pendent jurisdiction (and arguably ancillary jurisdic-
tion too) when (1) resolution of the federal claim necessarily decides the state claim; (2)
resolution of the federal claim necessarily decides crucial issues in the state claim; (3)
failure to decide the state claim makes the judgment of the federal claim "hollow"; (4)
double liability to a party is risked by failure to decide the state claim; (5) a federal
claim to property would leave a party with a state claim remediless if the state claim is
dismissed; or (6) double litigation would necessarily follow dismissal of the state claim.
Id. at 285.
This Comment rejects (6) as an issue of minor importance. See infra notes 123-124
and accompanying text. See also Yale Note, supra note 13, at 648-49 n.115. The objec-
tion to a standard of power more broad than the necessity formula, outlined above, is
simply that a greater number of cases will be brought to federal court that otherwise
would be decided in state court. Congress has a well settled policy of entrusting state
courts with the task of deciding matters of federal law. Shakman, supra note 12, at 266.
The same cannot be said for federal courts interpreting state law. Shakman criticizes
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than many cases indicate, the interests involved in the exercise
of discretion are quite separate from the interests underlying the
determination of power to hear a state claim. "Needless deci-
sions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity
and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for
them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.""" Thus, although
a state claim may be within the pendent jurisdiction of a court,
the court should exercise its jurisdiction only where necessary. 9
part of the Gibbs opinion for effectively expanding the concept of a "case", by citing a
number of authorities that do not support a test for pendent jurisdiction that is as broad
as post-Gibbs interpretations. Id. at 269.
The conclusion that Shakman does not draw, and that this Comment does, is that a
federal court is left with very little discretion when its power to adjudicate a state claim
is couched in language of comity, urgency, and necessity. Hence, in most cases where
courts have announced their use of Gibbs discretion in dismissing a state claim, they
really lacked the power to hear the state claim. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115,
1158 (5th Cir. 1982) (where the pleadings did not attempt to invoke pendent jurisdiction
over state law claims the trial court improperly decided those claims); Smith v. Meijer of
Ohio, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 113, 115-16 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (in a discrimination suit brought
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 621, the court recognized the power to hear plaintiff's state law
claims for breach of contract, but dismisssed the state claims because of the many differ-
ences in elements of proof); Fisher Foods, Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Liquor Control, 555 F.
Supp. 641, 649 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (the court used discretion to dismiss plaintiff's state law
claim that the tax on the base price of wine violated the Ohio Constitution, where plain-
tiff's federal claim asserted that the Liquor Control was engaging in resale price mainte-
nance in violation of the federal anti-trust laws); Wells v. Schwicker, 536 F. Supp. 1314,
1330 (E.D. La. 1982) (in a class action suit brought under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551, the federal court dismissed the plaintiff's state law claim that the
defendant also violated Louisiana's Administrative Procedure Act because the state law
was relatively unsettled and because the two claims would have had little evidentiary
overlap). This is so because use of the necessity perspective leads to the conclusion, in
those cases, that the state claim is not part of the same case as the federal claim. Where
these courts see lack of factual, evidentiary, or issue overlap as inconvenient for the court
or a party, and, therefore, warranting dismissal of the state claim, this analysis views the
lack as proof of two or more distinct constitutional cases, which deprives the court of the
power to hear the state claim.
Thus, a federal court should have discretion not to extend auxiliary jurisdiction in
only two instances. First, a federal court should not hear a state claim where federal
claims are dismissed from a suit before trial. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Assume that
jurisdiction over the state claim has been obtained by virtue of the necessity formula
described above. When the federal claims are dismissed before trial, there is no court
record to impair the state claim. The federal court, however, retains jurisdiction once
acquired, so a dismissal in this instance is not for lack of power to hear the state claim.
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 608 (1926). Second, a federal court
should dismiss a state claim where hearing both state and federal claims incurs a sub-
stantial risk of confusing a jury. In this case, the federal court must weigh the potential
harms to the parties involved, in either hearing or not hearing the state claim.
88. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
89. The Gibbs court viewed the adjudication of the state law claim before it as nec-
essary to ensure the rendering of full justice between the parties. At least two commenta-
tors believe that adjudication of Mr. Gibbs' Labor Management Relations Act claim
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B. The Convenience Perspective
Ancillary jurisdiction, more than pendent jurisdiction,
increasingly has been justified by convenience and not by neces-
sity. The decision in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange90
began this shift.91
Moore held that ancillary jurisdiction exists for compulsory
counterclaims. e2 At first glance, the holding seems to reflect the
necessity perspective because the consequence of failing to bring
a compulsory counterclaim is that the claim will be barred in a
subsequent proceeding.98 Such an approach, however, is circular
because the characterization of a counterclaim as compulsory
cannot rest on the consequence of such a characterization. Con-
sistent application of a logical definition of "transaction or
occurrence"94 is the only way a court can know if a counterclaim
is really compulsory. The Moore Court, however, made no
attempt to define transaction, calling it "a word of flexible
meaning."9 5 The Moore decision, then, is of little use in the for-
mulation of a workable definition of transaction, as contem-
plated by Equity Rule 30. Unfortunately, the Moore decision
developed into a per se rule with no logical foundation. 6
required findings of fact and law that compelled a particular result in his state law claim.
Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 123 (1966); Shakman, supra
note 12, at 264-65.
90. 270 U.S. 593 (1933).
91. See Matasar, supra note 13, at 1413. "[B]y the late 1960s federal courts . . .
noted that the new federal rules [as a whole] could be shoehorned into the Moore trans-
actional rule." Id.
92. Moore, 270 U.S. at 608.
93. Equity Rule 30, 268 U.S. 709 (1925), provides in pertinent part: "The answer
must state in short and simple form any counterclaim arising out of the transaction that
is the subject matter of the suit." (emphasis added). The significant difference between
Equity Rule 30 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) is that the latter is not limited
to equitable claims, but is open to legal claims as well. The effect of both rules, however,
is that failure to bring a compulsory counterclaim in an earlier proceeding is a waiver of
the right to bring it at a later date. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1403 at 14 (West 1983) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
94. Equity Rule 30, 268 U.S. 709 (1925).
95. Moore, 270 U.S. at 610.
96. Perhaps because of the Moore Court's failure to define transaction as it applied
to compulsory counterclaims under Equity Rule 30, courts that have confronted state
law counterclaims have merely cited Moore and routinely exercised ancillary jurisdiction.
See, e.g., United States ex rel. D'Agostino Excavators, Inc. v. Heyward-Robinson Co.,
430 F.2d 1077, 1080-82 (2d Cir. 1970); Chance v. County Bd. of School Trustees, 332
F.2d 971, 972-73 (7th Cir. 1964); Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286
F.2d 631, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1961); Lenz v. Wagner, 240 F.2d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1957). The
same routine application has occurred for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(g) cross-
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As a result of this rule, ancillary jurisdiction has been usedto effectuate the stated goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-dure-convenience and judicial economy. 7 Undefined phraseslike "transaction," "subject matter of the original claim," and"occurrence," enable the federal courts to determine that stateclaims are within the courts' ancillary jurisdiction whenever it isconvenient to so determine. As one commentator noted,"[T]here is a recurring temptation to view questions of federaljurisdiction as if they were simple procedural questions, to beresolved in whatever fashion will best serve the desirable goal of
efficient judicial administration. ' ' se
The shift from a necessity to a convenience perspective hascaused an expansion in the number of cases involving state lawthat are brought to federal court and an increasingly broadscope of the "case . . . arising under this Constitution, [and] thelaws of the United States . . . ." The Federal Rules them-selves, as well as the Constitution, militate against this
expansion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82 states that the Federal
"[R]ules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdic-tion of the United States district courts . ... 100 Courts thusmust use the Federal Rules within an existing framework of
power allocation, and their use may not extend jurisdiction.Since procedural rules cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court,attempts to "secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determina-tion"''1 of suits should not cause a distortion of jurisdictional
scope established from other sources.'0
claims, see supra note 43, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 impleader of third-partydefendants, see supra note 44, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 interpleader, seesupra note 45, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) intervention of right, see supra
note 46.
97. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
98. WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 3, at § 3502.
99. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also id. at §§ 3505-07 (noting a recent sharpincrease in the number of cases commenced in federal courts).
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 82. See also Washington-Southern Navig. Co. v. Baltimore &Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635 (1924) (decided prior to the Federal Rulesof Civil Procedure, in reference to Admiralty Rules: "Occasionally, a rule is employed toexpress. . . a principle of substantive law which has been established by statute or deci-sions. But no rule of court can enlarge or restrict jurisdiction.").
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
102. The sources of federal court jurisdiction-the power to interpret thelaw-derive from article III of the Constitution and statutes enacted by Congress. See,e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (federal question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982)(diversity jurisdiction); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (Congress can-
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Expanding upon the majority interpretation of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 82, Professor Wright notes that "courts can-
not employ the federal rule goal of settling the various aspects of
a particular dispute in one action to rationalize a violation of the
integrity of the congressional policy to restrict federal jurisdic-
tion . . . . 3 Thus, "[n]o consideration need be given to the
rules in determining whether a [federal] court has jurisdiction of
a particular action." 104 There is a virtual consensus that article
III of the Constitution, the provision which circumscribes fed-
eral court jurisdiction, was drafted with the intention of preserv-
ing state court jurisdiction. 10 5 The expansion of auxiliary juris-
diction to promote efficiency has produced an allocation of
federal and state jurisdiction at odds with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution. 06 The new allocation may be due,
not enlarge the article III, section 2 original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court).
103. WRIGHT & MILLER supra note 93, at § 1414 at 74.
104. WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER supra note 3, at § 3141 at 210-11.
105. Id. § 3502 at 4; Shakman, supra note 12; Yale Note, supra note 13, at 645. An
original draft of article III included "questions which involve national peace and har-
mony," in the judicial power of federal courts. Yale Note, supra note 12, at 644-45 n.99.
This language was stricken because of fears that the words "questions" and "involving"
would be impossible to limit, making it impossible to keep suits that rest primarily on
state law out of federal courts. Id.
106. The writings of Alexander Hamilton are representative of the framers' intent in
the area of the allocation of power between the federal government and the various state
governments. In THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (A. Hamilton), supra note 12, Hamilton states,
"State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before
had, and which were not by that act [the consolidation of states into a union by the
Constitution] exclusively delegated to the United States." Id. at 186 (emphasis in origi-
nal). More specifically, in THE FEDERALIST No. 82, he says, "[T]he State courts will
retain the jurisdiction they now have unless it appears to be taken away in one of the
enumerated modes." Id. at 513 (emphasis in original). The sentiment of the day, at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, was to let federal courts decide only matters of
federal law.
Some commentators have recently begun to argue, in persuasive terms, that Fram-
ers' intent is irrelevant to constitutional interpretation. For an excellent and comprehen-
sive debate on the relevance of Framers' intent, compare Monaghan, Our Perfect Consti-
tution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981) (advocating that courts stick to their attempt to
ascertain framers' intent and give such intent weight in constitutional adjudication) with
Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981) (urging an abandonment
of framers' intent, since it is both unknowable and unimportant in modern constitutional
adjudication). Professor Dworkin may soon win the conflict. Framers' intent, however, is
still looked to for guidance in interpreting the Constitution. The reason may be not so
much for reverence toward giants in American history as much as for stability of the
institution of government. Many legislators and judges still favor the ideals of federal-
ism-local solutions for local concerns, and an abhorrence of a central planning institu-
tion. Thus, when this Comment speaks of Framers' intent, it refers to a set of concepts
that many consider relevant to the structure of today's society, and not just a romantic
piece of historical curiosity.
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to some extent, to overzealous attempts to effectuate the goals of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-convenience and judicial
economyl'0 7-which conflict with the system of federalism envi-
sioned by the framers.
The allocation of the adjudicatory function between federal
and state courts is exceedingly fragile without a firm conception
of the contents of a constitutional "case." Questions of conve-
nience in the operation of the federal judicial system are entirely
subordinate to questions of power allocation between quasi-
autonomous governmental entities. 10 8 Under the convenience
perspective, the Supreme Court is able to expand the constitu-
tional "case" by simple rule promulgation. Thus, the Supreme
Court can virtually extinguish the role of state courts in inter-
preting their own law, all in the name of expedience, conve-
nience, and economy. This author is not the first to assert that
federalism is itself slow, inconvenient, and expensive.'0 9
C. A Construction of "Transaction" to Maintain the
Necessity Perspective
The convenience perspective is indeed a dangerous
approach to auxiliary jurisdiction because it enables the
Supreme Court to expand the definition of a constitutional"case" with alarming ease, thereby allowing the federal courts to
hear an ever increasing number of state law-based claims. In
order to preserve the role of state courts as the primary fora for
interpretation of state law-based claims, "transaction or occur-
rence" must be confined to a narrow definition. At least with
regard to compulsory counterclaims, four different definitions of
transaction or occurrence have been suggested. Are the issues of
fact and law raised by the two claims largely the same?"0 Would
res judicata bar a subsequent suit on the state claim absent com-
pulsoriness by virtue of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?".
107. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
108. See supra note 60; Minahan supra note 12; Yale Note supra note 13 at 648-49
n.115. But see Matasar, supra note 13, at 1478-79.
109. The idea of a government of enumerated powers and courts of limited jurisdic-
tion on the one hand, and the idea of judicial economy on the other, seem inherently
contradictory.
110. Connecticut Indem. Co. v. Lee, 168 F.2d 420, 423 (1st Cir. 1948); Nachtman v.Crucible Steel Co., 165 F.2d 997, 999 (3d Cir. 1948); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union Inc.,
384 F. Supp. 600, 602 (D.C. Mass. 1974).
111. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Indus. Corp., 154 F.2d 814, 818
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Will substantially the same evidence support or refute both
claims?' 2 Is there any logical relation between the original claim
and the auxiliary claim?113 The first and third tests are problem-
atic because there is no ready way to ascertain the degree of fac-
tual or evidentiary overlap that a court will require to conclude
that two claims are parts of one case.14 The second test only
begs the question, for res judicata follows from a finding that the
state claim arose out of the same transaction as the federal
claim." 5
The fourth test has by far the widest acceptance among the
courts." 6 Courts differ, however, in their interpretations of "logi-
cal relation," just as they differed in constructions of "cause of
action," "transaction," and "common nucleus of operative fact."
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Revere Copper & Brass
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., "7 defined "transaction"
or "occurrence" as
the subject matter of a claim, rather than the legal rights aris-
ing therefrom . . . . The same aggregate or core of facts may
give rise not only to rights in the plaintiff against the defen-
dant [the federal claim] but also to rights in the [defendant]
against third parties [the state claim] . . . [T]he court which
has jurisdiction over the aggregate of facts which constitutes
the plaintiffs claim needs not [sic] additional ground of juris-
diction to determine the third-party claim which compromises
[sic] the same core of facts. '8
The Revere description of the logical relation necessary for
two claims to arise out of a single transaction closely resembles
(Frank, J., dissenting) (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 859 (1946); Big Cola Corp. v.
World Bottling Co., 134 F.2d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 1943); Bose Corp., 384 F. Supp. at 602;
Berryhill v. Gibson, 331 F. Supp. 122, 126 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
112. Non-Ferrous Metals, Inc. v. Saramar Aluminum Co., 25 F.R.D. 102, 105 (N.D.
Ohio 1960); Kuster Laboratories, Inc. v. Lee, 10 F.R.D. 350, 351 (D.C. Cal. 1960).
113. Moore, 270 U.S. at 609-10; Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 715-16 (5th Cir. 1970); Koufakis v. Carvel, 425 F.2d 892, 899 (2d
Cir. 1970); D'Agostino Inc., 430 F. Supp. at 1081.
114. See Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modern
Pleading, 38 MINN. L. REv. 423, 438-45 (1954) (advocates a test to determine whether a
claim is compulsory or permissive rather than search for a definition of transaction or
occurrence).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
116. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 93, at § 1410 at 48.
117. 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970).
118. Id. at 713.
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the Hurn definition of cause of action.'19 Both focus on the acts
or events that constitute the violation of a legal right. Where
those acts or events, or core of operative facts, support remedial
rights under both state law and federal law, the state and federal
claims can be said to arise out of the same transaction or occur-
rence, and hence are parts of a single constitutional "case."
The Revere standard signifies a meaningful turn back in the
direction of the necessity perspective; Revere allows federal
courts to consistently apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
without allowing such application to have the expansive effect
on jurisdiction that results from loose definitions of terms. O If
the acts that violate a state-based right are not the same as the
acts that violate a federal right, the state claim is not compul-
sory, because the federal court lacks the subject matter jurisdic-
tion to hear it. Res judicata and collateral estoppel, therefore,
will not affect the party's ability to successfully bring the state
claim at a later time. But where the same acts give rise to both
federal and state rights, the state claim is part of the same"case" as the federal claim. 2 ' Failure to extend auxiliary juris-
diction in this circumstance would run the risk of impairing the
state claim, for the federal court will be unable to avoid makingfindings of fact, or deciding issues, that are central to the state
claim. 22
V. CONCLUSION
A return to the necessity perspective in determining when a
federal court may decide issues of state law in non-diversity
cases will offer both obvious and latent benefits. Fewer cases will
crowd federal court dockets. When a suit containing federal and
state claims is brought before a federal court, and the court con-
cludes that the claims represent two distinct cases under the
necessity perspective, the process of coming to such a conclusion
minimizes the risk that adjudication of the federal claim alone
would impair the state claim in a future adjudication at the
state level. 2 3
119. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
120. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
121. Revere, 426 F.2d at 715-16; Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
122. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
123. "[A] claim has a logical relationship to the original claim if it arises out of thesame aggregate of operative facts as the original claim in two senses: (1) that the sameaggregate of operative facts serves as the basis of both claims; or (2) that the aggregate
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The cost of the necessity approach to auxiliary jurisdiction
is that some parties will be forced into two lawsuits instead of
one if they elect to bring their federal and state claims to federal
court instead of bringing all of their claims to a state court. This
attitude, however, is true to the rather fundamental characteri-
zation of jurisdiction as a question of constitutional power. No
justification exists for the defection of auxiliary jurisdiction doc-
trines from the constitutional "case" concept, and this Comment
urges a conscious return to that concept. The dismissal of state
claims from federal court has been applauded by commentators
and the Supreme Court alike to enhance and protect federalism
principles.124 Liberal dismissals are justified in the context of
auxiliary jurisdiction because, unrestrained, the two doctrines
have the capacity to topple the framework of a bifurcated sys-
tem of justice.
David Lawyer
core of facts upon which the original claim rests activates additional legal rights in a
party defendant that would otherwise remain dormant." Revere, 426 F.2d at 715
(emphasis in original). In all other situations, two claims are not parts of a single case,
and adjudication of the federal claim should not affect the state claim.
124. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 ("Needless decisions of state law should be avoided [by
federal courts] both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by
procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.") See also Shakman, supra
note 12, at 266 (federal court determinations of state law can safely be avoided because
cases decided in state court can be appealed on their federal issues, and because Con-
gress can make federal jurisdiction exclusive where state courts show a pattern of incom-
petency or discrimination); Yale Note, supra note 13, at 638-39 ("By tying federal juris-
diction to a body of federal law and thereby divorcing that jurisdiction from state law,
this 'source of law' examination preserves a system of limited jurisdiction.").
